Columns

Danielle Duffield argues that they do; Nick Gavey disagrees.

Danielle:
When Mary Wollstonecraft published “A Vindication of the Rights of Woman” in 1792, British philosopher Thomas Taylor responded by publishing a satirical piece entitled “A Vindication of The Rights of Brutes,” pointing out that Wollstonecraft’s reasoning as to why women have rights applies equally to animals. And so he warned society: if we accept this ridiculous idea that women actually have rights, we’ll have to accept this even crazier idea that animals have rights.
Just like women’s rights, the notion of animal rights really isn’t that radical. It’s the simple idea that when it comes to the most basic rights – moving freely, experiencing sunshine and fresh air, caring for one’s young, and expressing other natural instincts necessary for a pleasurable life – as sentient beings, animals have interests identical to those of humans. As in the case of human rights, these interests form the basis of the most fundamental rights that work to protect animals from suffering.
This argument is often met with the mere assertion that animals don’t have rights simply because they’re not human. But what morally significant characteristics do all humans possess that animals do not? The main difference between humans and other animals is our intelligence. But high intelligence can’t be the basis of rights: we still grant rights to small children and intellectually handicapped adults, many of whom are less intelligent than some animals (e.g. chimpanzees and pigs have the intelligence of ten-year-old and three-year-old humans respectively). It’s not enough to simply assert that these people have rights by virtue of being a member of our ‘special’ species, when these people lack the very characteristics that supposedly make us special.
Ultimately, the reason we recognise the rights of even the most intellectually (or emotionally) impaired humans is that these people are still sentient – they can still experience pain and pleasure like us. The one characteristic we share with all of humanity is an ability to suffer. As inconvenient as this may be, we share this characteristic with animals too. 
Finally, the argument that it is wrong to harm animals only because it reflects badly on the perpetrator is flawed. If animals have no moral status and hence no rights, then inflicting suffering on them would not reflect badly on the perpetrator at all; under this conception of animals, they wouldn’t be doing anything wrong.
 
Nick: 
 
Animals do not have rights. Most people instinctively realise this. This is reflected in the fact that our society embraces the ownership of animals, the killing of animals, and the eating of animals. The most basic of rights are the right to life and the right to self-ownership and self-determination. Every person who enjoys bacon for breakfast and steak for dinner recognises that animals do not hold these rights. Rights apply only to our own species, Homo Sapiens.
I contend this is true for two reasons. The first is that humans are better than other species. We are more intelligent, more self-aware, and have a much, much greater emotional range. Danielle argues that exceptions exist in the case of small children, intellectually disabled people, and the like. The point she misses is that this argument is about which species we accord rights to as a whole, and individual exceptions are irrelevant. We accord rights to humans because they share the characteristics I referred to, and other species do not. We don’t farm disabled people because they belong to our species, which is far more advanced on aggregate.
The second reason is one based on similarity. In other words humans recognise that other humans have rights, because they are members of the same species. In principle, this argument is intuitively correct. So, people extend the greatest consideration towards members of their own family, then to members of their own nation, and finally to humankind generally. The average person would go to much greater lengths to help out their own sister than they would a random person from a random country. But even in the case of the random, they would still recognise a basic level of rights. Other species are sufficiently far removed not to be accorded any rights whatsoever.
One caveat – a refusal to recognise that animals have rights does not preclude an interest in conservation or welfare. Wiping out entire species, or egregiously torturing animals is wrong - but not because of any intrinsic rights that animals have. It is wrong because of how it reflects on the character of perpetrator. The first SPCA was founded in 1824, distinct from any conception of animal rights. Any person concerned about the welfare of animals should donate to them, and not to PETA. And don’t feel guilty about eating meat.
 
Debatable is a column written by the Otago University Debating Society. They meet every Tuesday at 7pm in Commerce 2.20.