Matty Stroller
Druggie
Articles by Matty Stroller
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Features
Issue 25 28/09/2014A short introduction to Iraq and the rise of ISIS
Earlier this year I had several promising job leads surface in Kurdish Northern Iraq. As a student of Middle Eastern politics, Iraqi Kurdistan (effectively an independent state in all but name) represents the perfect compromise: it’s relatively safe, yet close enough to the region’s “hot-spots” to be immersed in events as they unfold on the ground. With only a month or so left until I permanently relocated to the Middle East, a ruthless and determined group of violent Sunni Muslim extremists known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) have seriously started to fuck with my job prospects. My petty employment concerns aside, what is currently taking place in Syria and Iraq is a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions. I recently had a Skype conversation with a friend based in Baghdad. Her normally stoic demeanour was nowhere to be seen, in its place, a teary-eyed, expletive-ridden tirade about the “modern day barbarians” inflicting so much suffering on her country and its people. In late June ISIS declared the establishment of a new “Islamic Caliphate” spanning the estimated 35,000km of contiguous territory under their control in vast swathes of Syria and Iraq. The declaration – the biggest affront to the arbitrary borders imposed by the British and French Sykes-Picot agreement since their inception – occurred on the heels of ISIS’s surprise blitzkrieg offensive earlier that month, in which the group seized around a third of Iraq – including its second largest city – along with a treasure trove of sophisticated US-made weaponry that was abandoned by the Iraqi army. This is no rag-tag group of mindless fanatics. ISIS’s military success on both sides of the border has evidenced a level of strategic and tactical astuteness that would impress Sun Tzu. Furthermore, most analysts now believe ISIS has achieved complete financial self sufficiency – through a combination of extortion, taxation, old fashion pillaging, kidnapping and oil revenues, ISIS has become the richest terrorist organisation in history. With tangible gains and money on its side, the group has attracted thousands of fighters from around the world and continues to attract thousands more. Its savvy use of social media to spread propaganda and sew fear in its enemies is indicative of a Jihadi outfit aimed at the millennial generation. In the words of US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, “ISIS is beyond anything we’ve seen.” A good news day in the Middle East is pretty much an oxymoron. Virtually every night our television screens bombard us with a morbid collection of images and sound bites from the three or four Middle Eastern countries that suffered enough that day to be deemed newsworthy. Context is always elusive. In its place we learn death tolls, see bloodied bodies, and hear a never-ending procession of angry Arabs chanting and grieving. The end result of all of this is banal expectation. Few horrors that emerge from this seemingly cursed corner of the world cause us to bat an eyelid – we expect them to happen. A sigh of sympathy followed by prolonged indifference is the best response most of us can muster. And that is a completely understandable reaction. War, revolution and political turmoil are (almost always) complex social phenomena to explain. Myriad casual factors, competing narratives and highly fluid situations often render such events inaccessibly complicated for the casual observer. The Middle East embodies this rule of thumb; narratives are oversimplified out of journalistic necessity or, by default, omitted altogether. Enter ISIS (a.k.a evil incarnate), if I attempted to detail all of the group’s (growing) catalogue of atrocities it would consume the rest of my word limit – indiscriminate bombings, beheadings, the mass enslavement of woman and children, the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, attempted genocide, the list, unfortunately, goes on. Herein lies ISIS’s unique position within the stream of bad news emanating from the Middle East. Rarely has a news story been so morally unambiguous, the narrative so unanimously condemning across different, ideologically opposed news sources as the ascendance of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This is reinforced by the fact that ISIS has precipitated an unlikely unity of purpose between long time geopolitical foes; Russia, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah – even Al Qaeda – are just as invested in the demise of ISIS as the US, EU, Israel, and Arab Gulf states. So now the Syrian regime (who the US has been actively trying to oust) and the US are simultaneously bombing the same organisation on different sides of a now redundant border while Al-Qaeda sits back and quietly hopes they succeed. Welcome to the world of Middle Eastern politics, never boring and always full of plot twists! For the remainder of this article I want to try and place ISIS in context. Most coverage to date has focussed on their brutality and/or the day-to-day ebb and flow of the battlefield (which looks set to change dramatically due to intensified US involvement). The following will instead attempt to identify and explain some of the major long-term and proximate casual factors behind the group’s meteoric rise. Fittingly, the ascendance of ISIS is a direct consequence of the two most cataclysmic events in modern Middle Eastern History – both in terms of geopolitical ramifications and human suffering: The 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the on-going Syrian Civil War. Iraq.Iraq is comprised of three main groups: Sunni Muslim Arabs (20 per cent); Kurds (20 per cent); and Shia Muslim Arabs (65 per cent). Prior to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, Sunni Arabs had maintained a stranglehold on power since Iraq’s independence – often employing extreme violence to keep the Kurds and Shia in check. It was fairly obvious to many observers that the removal of Saddam would likely lead to sectarian score-settling as a new internal balance of power took hold. In a stunning example of great power hubris, it seems this possibility did not occur to the war’s key architects; George W. Bush reportedly learnt of the Sunni/Shia divide only weeks before the invasion began. To make matters worse, the Bush administration – blinded by overconfidence – adopted a criminally minimalistic plan for the post-war occupation of Iraq. As a consequence of this, the country descended into chaos in the invasion’s aftermath. Thus, in the absence of a functional state, sectarian identities became the new organising principle of Iraqi society, militias proliferated on all sides, and a bloody civil war ensued. A secondary pretext for the invasion put forward by the Bush Administration was the dubious suggestion that Saddam Hussein had links to Al Qaeda. Anyone vaguely familiar with the region knew this was an absurd claim. Saddam, whose regime was a secular dictatorship, considered Islamic extremists to be an existential threat and treated them as such. Ironically, the imagined anti-American Jihadist threat in Iraq became very real as the occupying US forces attracted thousands of Islamic militants from around the region begging for a crack at the “far enemy” in their own backyard. It is here we can locate ISIS’s genesis: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Founded in 2003, AQI successfully exploited Sunni fears of Shia domination and resentment towards the US occupation allowing it to establish large safe havens in the Western part of the country. Their puritanical brand of Sunni Islam held that all Shia were heretics who deserved nothing less than death. Accordingly, AQI split their energy between attacking the occupying forces and slaughtering Shia by the thousands, stoking the flames of a then nascent civil war. Despite only ever constituting a small percentage of the overall insurgency, AQI’s penchant for spectacular attacks and the West’s obsession with all things Al-Qaeda led to the group dominating media coverage of the conflict. By late 2006 AQI’s marriage of convenience with Western Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni tribes came to an end. The group’s imposition of its medieval world view on the local population ultimately proved to be its undoing. Fed up, the tribes pragmatically opted for the lesser of two evils, reconciled with US forces, and turned their weapons on their former allies. The organisation persisted to cause significant trouble, but its operational capacity was greatly diminished and it continued to decline over time. Fast forward to 2011, after seven years of bloody conflict the Iraq War ended and the US swiftly wiped their hands clean of what had been a traumatic ordeal. Although militant attacks remained a daily occurrence, a modicum of stability had been achieved and the ball was firmly in the Shia-dominated government of Nouri-Al Maliki’s court. Tragically, instead of trying to quell Sunni anxieties with a conciliatory approach to governance, Maliki surrounded himself with sycophants and pursued a narrow sectarian agenda – alienating the Sunni minority back to the point of open rebellion. Inspired by the Arab Spring, Iraq’s Sunnis began a sustained protest movement demanding fairer treatment from the government. Their demands were met with harsh repression and after a particularly brutal government crackdown in late 2012, the situation began to spiral out of hand with the central government effectively losing control over parts of the country. Against this backdrop of increasing tension AQI – who had now rebranded themselves as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) – began steadily intensifying their attacks on Shia civilians and the Iraqi state. Once again, Iraq’s disillusioned Sunni majority areas became fertile recruitment grounds for AQI, and as things continued to deteriorate, a resurgent AQI – thriving on renewed social and political tensions – sprang back into the spotlight. In sum - whatever your opinion on the merits of the war is - it is an indisputable fact that the forces unleashed by the US’s illegal invasion of Iraq and its subsequent gross mismanagement of the occupation, directly led to the creation of the now out of control Jihadi Frankenstein terrorising the region. Another important interrelated outcome of the invasion’s fallout, perhaps the war’s main legacy, is how sectarianism has since established itself as the dominant prism through which regional developments are analysed and understood. Syria.As the years have passed by, the apocalyptic carnage taking place every day in Syria has predictably receded out of the headlines. With at least 190,000 dead (the real toll likely much higher), nine million displaced, and no end in sight, the Syrian Civil War is perhaps the greatest man-made disaster of our time. What began as a popular uprising against a brutal dictator has transformed into a multi-layered, internationalised conflict of daunting complexity. A couple of years ago, few would have picked that Bashir al-Assad would not only still be in power now, but also be slowly winning – street by street, neighbourhood by neighbourhood – in a gruesome battle of attrition. This is largely a result of the enormous amount of political and material support Assad has received from Russia and Iran, both of whom consider Assad to be an indispensible strategic ally; Kaddafi may well have still been in power if these two states considered him so useful. Like Iraq, Syria’s population is comprised of a diverse sectarian makeup. Since the early 1970s, Assad’s Alawite sect (an offshoot of Shia Islam) has enjoyed disproportionate representation in the upper echelons of state power – an inadvertent legacy of French colonial policy. Around 30 per cent of the population are a mixture of Christians, Shia, Alawii, Druze and Kurds, while the remaining seventy per cent are Sunni Muslims. Therefore, the political situation in Syria parallels Saddam-era Iraq, except the sectarian dynamic is reversed; a Shia minority dominates power at the expense of the Sunni majority. The regime responded to the protests that erupted across Syria in March 2011 with bullets, mass detentions and torture. Because working class and rural Sunnis were both a majority of the population and the most alienated from power, civil disorder was most acute in areas where they were concentrated. During their calls for freedom, democracy and social justice, protesters went to great lengths to emphasis tolerance and unity in order to address fears of a sectarian agenda. In turn, Assad labelled them terrorists hell-bent on the extermination of Syria’s minorities. After braving bullets day after day, for six months to no avail, members of the revolution began taking up arms against the regime. Between late 2011 and late-2012 the majority of the armed opposition fought under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – made up of ordinary Syrians who felt armed struggle was their only alternative after non-violent action had failed so miserably. This situation started to change in the latter half of 2012. Syria had become the new Iraq, attracting thousands of jihadists from both the region and wider globe. In addition, as the West continued to debate the merits of arming the FSA, huge influxes of Gulf Arab money flowed into the pockets of hard-line Islamist groups, swelling their ranks and giving them a huge material advantage on the battlefield. Islamist groups – of all stripes and sizes – gradually began to supplant the FSA as the dominant fighting force on the ground. The Islamic State of Iraq entered the fray in early 2013, changing their name to ISIS soon after. Initially welcomed by an opposition desperate to receive whatever help it could get, ISIS quickly proved themselves to be a potent fighting force. But by the end of the year relations had soured, and a war within a war broke out between an alliance of Syrian rebels and the extremist group. Although ISIS’s brutal tactics and behaviour towards the local population played a part in this, the primary reason for the conflict was a divergence of objectives. Despite the ideological pluralism of Syria’s various rebel groups, which range from secular nationalist to groups similarly fanatical to ISIS, their shared primary objective is the overthrow of Assad’s regime. In contrast, ISIS is predominantly concerned with the creation of an Islamic State across the Sunni majority areas of Syria and Iraq (which it has since effectively achieved). After consolidating its grip on North-eastern Syria, ISIS redirected its energy back towards Iraq, merging the two conflicts in the process. Assad deliberately played the sectarian card to secure the continued loyalty of Syria’s minorities in the early stages of the uprising. Despite being self-serving propaganda, it worked and they coalesced around his rule out of fear of the unknown. Subsequently, Assad’s intransigence has imposed an atrocious war on the Syrian people, and because of this, Assad’s initial narrative – of Sunni terrorists trying to take over Syria – has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nowhere has Assad’s Machiavellian cynicism been more apparent than in his treatment of ISIS. Until recently, a mutual understanding between ISIS and the Assad regime resulted in little actual fighting occurring between the two. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, ISIS provides the ultimate bogeyman for Assad to contrast himself against in the eyes of both Syrians and the international community. Secondly, the areas of Syria ISIS controls are of secondary strategic importance to the survival of his regime. And thirdly, ISIS’s on-going war against Syrian rebel groups relives some of the burden on the army, reduces the capacity and presence of more moderate groups, and in doing so further delegitimizes the struggle against the regime. The recent spike in regime attacks on ISIS is likely better explained as a PR stunt by Assad – positioning himself as an ally in the war on terrorism – than action out of military necessity. A major debate is currently occurring in Western foreign policy circles about what could have been done to prevent the rise of ISIS. The main argument put forward is that if the West had armed the Syrian opposition with the weapons they needed during the early period of the war, before radical Islamists took centre stage, they could have overthrown Assad, ending the conflict and denying ISIS an operational safe haven. I was in Syria and Lebanon in early 2012 – just as the armed conflict started to dramatically expand. During my time there, and through a very fortuitous set of circumstances, I had the privilege of meeting a young opposition activist from Homs called Danny. The victim of a recent assassination attempt, Danny had become somewhat of a spokesman for the opposition and FSA in Western media due to the fact he was half British. When we first met in downtown Beirut, he had just returned from a meeting with several European governments in Brussels, his primary concern: weapons. He was incredibly specific about the kind of weapons needed to turn the tide, and emphasised the unanimous desire within the rebel ranks for urgent and large-scale foreign assistance. The weapons never came – not in decisive quantities anyway – and, unfortunately, hindsight does not enable us to know what would have happened if they did. In general terms, ISIS is symptomatic of much wider problems afflicting the Muslim and Arab world. The group is an extreme manifestation of a disturbing undercurrent within Sunni Islam, which has steadily grown in strength since the 1980s. The conservative Arab Gulf states bear much responsibility for this. Using their immense resource wealth, they have vigorously exported their puritanical brand of Sunni Islam around the world. In doing so, traditional religious authorities have often been subverted by a new wave of Gulf-bankrolled hardliners – whose exploitation of young Muslims justified anger at aspects of Western foreign policy, has had profound consequences. It is an uncomfortable reality that the gap between Saudi Arabia’s official ideology and that of ISIS is far smaller than some may think. Thus, the religious environment that incubates groups like ISIS can only be combated through a process of deep introspection within the Sunni Muslim community. During a recent conversation with an Egyptian friend he talked about the Arab world’s tendency to externalise blame and avoid realistic self-assessment. This notion is perhaps best captured by the prevalence of conspiracy theories on the Arab street. For example, the idea that ISIS is a deliberate US creation has gained traction in recent times. Robert Fisk aptly refers to this phenomenon as “the Plot” – the hidden hand behind all of the region’s misfortunes. It reflects the general malaise of the Arab world; a product of the sentiment that events are irrevocably beyond the Arab street’s control. There is an element of truth to this. Few parts of the globe can claim the degree of external meddling suffered by the Middle East. The initial promise of the Arab Spring bucked this trend, instilling a renewed sense of agency and hope in the Arab masses that were intent on reclaiming the right to control their own destiny. Tragically, subsequent events have largely extinguished that flame and ordinary Arabs, who merely desire the chance at a dignified existence, are increasingly caught between two unpleasant extremes: Islamic extremism and brutal authoritarianism. One thing is for sure, in the current socio-political climate, so long as Sunnis remain down trodden and disenfranchised in their own countries, groups like ISIS will continue to occupy our headlines.
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Features
Issue 12 19/05/2013Balls Deep in the Arab Spring
For as long as I can remember, I have had a weird infatuation with all things Middle Eastern. In late 2011/early 2012 – after a year and a half of soul-crushing wage-slavery – I excitedly embarked on a three-month tour of the “Arab Spring.” It is one thing to read about a situation on your laptop screen or in a newspaper; it is quite another to live, breath, and feel it. Salivating at the prospect of embedding myself in the emotionally-charged upheavals occurring across the region, I departed with three t-shirts, one shirt, one pair of jeans, a couple of pairs of socks and boxers, a notebook, and an open mind. General chaos ensued. The predictable close calls with bombs, bullets and machete-wielding maniacs aside, one experience in particular stands out from my time in the region as especially worthy of rendition in Critic: how I somehow became involved in a seedy, morally questionable, amateur Egyptian pornography. *** Central to this story is my good friend Omar*, a 28-year-old sex-obsessed bodybuilder. Few individuals I’ve encountered in this life have exhibited such high levels of human kindness and genuine decency as Omar the Egyptian. Some of this story’s more grisly details may throw that claim into contention, but I assure you, he has a heart of gold and the best of intentions. I met Omar while he was working at a hotel during my first trip to Cairo in 2009. Since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt’s once-thriving tourism industry has been plunged into disarray. Frequent scenes of political violence have dissuaded risk-averse Westerners from visiting, in turn leading to thousands of Egyptians – including Omar – losing their jobs and livelihoods. There is a great irony in mainstream perceptions of the Middle East. Sure, the region is plagued by chronic instability, but in terms of general interpersonal violence and crime, I felt a great deal safer aimlessly wandering around the labyrinthine alleyways of Cairo, Damascus and Amman at night than any comparably large European or American city. That may be gender-specific – travelling alone in the region as a woman presents its fair share of obstacles. But based on my experience, the Middle East does not deserve its sordid reputation as a tourist destination only for those with a serious death wish. Anyway, back to my pornographic exploits. I stayed with Omar at his family home in a lively, overcrowded and somewhat dilapidated little corner of Cairo called Al-Matariyyah. Cairo is not for the faint hearted. It overloads the senses, drains whatever energy you have, and fucks with your mind in a big fucking way. In sum, it’s awesome, albeit an acquired taste. One night, after a non-stop barrage of shisha, hash and animated political discussion, Omar insisted I meet his fiancée, Fatima*. A five-minute walk later we were waiting outside her house. Omar then confided in me that he was apprehensive about the marriage. He loved her, but had heard from many friends that the high point of marriage is the wedding itself and quickly after one “begins to hate life.” I unconvincingly attempted to reassure him everything would be fine. Eventually, a young woman in traditional Muslim dress with a shy demeanour emerged onto the street. The encounter was fleeting, slightly awkward, and very formal; the complete opposite of the twisted sexual odyssey that defined our second interaction. *** It was (and still is) a special time in Egypt. The revolution jolted Egyptians out of the apathetic and cynical slumber that had characterised my first visit. The atmosphere was one of cautious optimism and palpable anger; everyone was talking politics, and a renewed sense of pride and empowerment could be felt on the streets. Omar and his friends had been on the vanguard of the February revolution, and it was an absolute privilege to hear their battle stories first hand. During my last days in Egypt, I faced a dilemma. I had arranged to visit a friend in Italy for a week or so and then head to Lebanon. The anniversary of the revolution was around the corner and Omar and co insisted that I come back and experience the events and emotions myself. After a little bit of thought, I decided that being in the middle of a small part of history was well worth the extra expenditure and booked return flights. Upon my return, it was obvious that Cairo was on edge. Most of the people I talked to in the street were adamant the anniversary would degenerate into a wanton bloodbath between SCAF, the transitional military government, and protesters unsatisfied with the revolution’s progress. I began feeling a little anxious. Omar and co promised that they would look after me in the event that everything went to shit, but when you are in the midst of a million-strong mob and things get violent, there is only so much a handful of friendly faces can do. When the much-anticipated morning arrived, I heard the familiar wolf-whistles on the street below, signalling it was time to head out into the great unknown. Then something inexplicable happened: Omar refused to get out of bed and emphatically stated he did not want to head downtown. This was puzzling; Omar’s lobbying was the main reason I had come back, and now, over the course of a few hours, he had completely changed his mind. Confused and a little concerned about my good friend, I nonetheless jumped on the metro with a decent-sized contingent of young hot-blooded revolutionaries and headed towards Tarhir Square. Another friend called Youssef* had organised an entourage of mid-ranking Muslim Brotherhood members to escort me around for the day. When it became apparent that the prophesised bloodbath was fortunately not going to happen, the brothers’ incessant, often aggressive competition for my attention became a new source of constant stress. Although there were a few violent incidents here and there, overall the day was an amazing feast for the senses. Part-protest, part-celebration, the anniversary was a testament to the colourful political mosaic that had emerged in Egypt since the revolution. I also managed to achieve one of my lifelong goals during the day: to be in the middle of a thousands-strong “Allah Akbar” mob – I even partook in a few “Allah Akbars” myself, much to the amusement of my pious escorts. Content with how the day had unfolded, my thoughts turned to Omar and I decided to go and get to the bottom of his sudden change of heart. The next 24 hours were unequivocally the weirdest of my life thus far. *** I returned to find Omar slumped in a chair in his room, listening to terrible music and looking at pictures of scantily dressed woman. He appeared fragile and a little dejected. I soon learnt that Omar’s seemingly schizophrenic apprehension about the day was more than justified. Only a month earlier, during a confrontation with the military in downtown Cairo, Omar’s best friend was shot in the face and later died whilst standing beside him. To describe the conversation that followed as “deep and meaningful” would be a gross understatement. Omar then proposed a beer in town, pedantically clarifying in the process that he was, in fact, a good Muslim and usually did not drink, but since I was his guest he had an obligation to partake in the wicked ways of the West. A night of beer, belly-dancers and aimless wandering followed, complete with a lynch mob, Arabic rap-battles and lots of sex-related chat. By the time we returned to Omar’s in the early hours of the morning, I was physically and mentally exhausted. Omar refused to let me rest, keeping me up until sunrise with some very sentimental pillow talk. Immediately after expressing how sad he was that I had not converted to Islam and therefore could not jam out with him in “paradise,” he began to systematically go through his favourite porn videos with the vigour and attention to detail of an esteemed film critic. He also informed me that he and his fiancée had been sexually active for a while and that it was great to finally have someone to talk to about it. I could have never anticipated the depraved places that talk would end up taking me. For a lot of Egyptians, and especially for Omar, I felt like my presence permitted the discussion of topics normally surrounded by taboo. I gave them an outlet to vent their innermost curiosities about sex and all its associated complexities. The recurring fascination with Western sexuality I encountered contained a great deal of cultural misunderstanding; the hyper-sexualised representations of Western women in films, music and porn appeared to have convinced many Egyptian males that the West was nothing more than a frenzied sex free-for-all. Elements of this perception are true, but the fundamental dissonance between what Omar thought was normal for me and what is actually normal paved the way for the debauchery ahead. “Matty, would you do me the biggest favour anyone has ever done?” Omar said as the sun was coming up and I was to finally get some sleep. I instantly responded in the affirmative; Omar had been an unbelievable host and we had become very close friends. “Would you film me and my fiancée with your camera?” What the fuck? Shocked at the proposition, I dismissively laughed it off and finally managed to joe out. *** A few hours’ sleep later, I awoke to Omar’s wrinkled mother standing over my bed holding the phone. It was Omar giving me directions to meet him and his fiancée after her exam finished. 45 minutes later, while en route, I had a sudden flashback to our drunken conversation earlier that morning. “Jesus Christ, surely not,” I thought. I started to get a little nervous as I entered the last leg of the journey and hoped to some God that what I thought might happen wasn’t going to. As the three of us travelled by bus to the house they intended to move into after the wedding a few hours outside of Cairo, nothing seemed too unusual. “It was nothing more than uninhibited drunken chat,” I thought to myself with relief. From the outside, the house did not look too dissimilar to Luke Sywalker’s swell pad from the original Star Wars. Inside was a different story. Apart from a mass of cigarette butts and discarded Pepsi cans, the house’s only contents were an old ragged mattress and a small stereo. I started to worry again; the place was exactly how I’d envisaged Alf Stewart’s infamous rape dungeon. I walked into the kitchen to find Omar standing behind me. “Did you bring your camera?” he asked. The dreaded confirmation had happened. I told Omar that this whole plan of his was entirely fucked and I did not feel particularly comfortable about it. “What the hell does Fatima think about this?” I asked. “I’ll tell her soon,” he replied. Shit – the already morally ambiguous situation I had found myself in had ascended to new levels of seediness. In a flustered and frustrated state, I swiftly left to buy a pack of cigarettes and think about how to handle the situation. When I got back to the dungeon 20 minutes later, I was greeted by Omar’s best Jason Gunn impersonation: a big cheesy grin and two thumbs up. My will to resist was gone. I took a deep breath, accepted whatever was going to happen in the sacred name of experience, and entered the room. The traditional Muslim dress Fatima had been wearing had been replaced with see-through lingerie, and Omar wasted no time in baring his quite impressive all. Resigned to my fate, I sat down on a speaker and turned on my camera. Things got hardcore pretty quickly; foreplay was obviously not a major priority. Once things got going, all the weirdness and apprehension dissipated and I got quite enthused about my unfolding amateur production. Omar assumed the role of actor/director, assertively dictating me around the barren windowless room. “Close-ups Matty, more close-ups!” Those words will be seared into my brain for the rest of my life. Just as I had achieved a modicum of comfort with the situation, Fatima began to lunge at me in a very sexual way. Omar actively encouraged this and started insisting that I partake in the twisted sexfest, which by this point would not have been entirely out of place on Extremetube. A sigh of indifference later, I put my camera down and reminded myself that I only live once. Several unspeakable acts followed as Omar exited the room for a much-deserved smoko. Another half hour passed and, though impressed with Omar’s superhuman stamina, I was starting to have serious concerns about making my 7pm flight. I exited the room to chain smoke and reconcile what had just happened with whatever semblance of morality I still had left. All I could think about was how absurdly divorced the whole situation was from most people’s preconceptions about the Middle East. This kind of stuff isn’t supposed to happen in a conservative Muslim society, is it? My initial politeness quickly gave way to stress and harassment. Filming had long since ceased and I kept popping inside at three-minute intervals to tell Omar to hurry the fuck up and finish himself off. When the big climax finally happened, I’d never been so relieved to hear an ear-piercing orgasm in my life. And like so often after an orgasm, the reality of what had just happened only then began to properly sink in. *** On the way back, I sat awkwardly between Omar and Fatima – for two whole hours. Very little was said and there was a sense that everyone felt a little ashamed of their actions. The awkwardness and tension may have been unbearable had my mind not been obsessively preoccupied with time, and my lack thereof. We dropped Fatima off at home and continued back to Omar’s. “I think Fatima feels weird about what just happened,” Omar said to me. Captain Obvious Omar went on: he had apparently explained to Fatima that this kind of stuff happens all the time where I’m from. It doesn’t, and I couldn’t help feeling that my lack of clarification on the subject would cause problems for both parties in the future. Unfortunately, uploading the video was well beyond the ability of Omar’s ancient computer. Without warning, Omar darted out the door, presumably to an internet café. Fuck. After a quick cost-benefit analysis I concluded I would have to find another way to retrieve the camera. Convinced I had already missed my flight, I flagged down a taxi and requested that he drive like a maniac towards the airport. A couple of kilometres down the road I saw an equally distraught-looking character darting in between traffic. It was Omar. I told the driver to stop and called out his name. Omar ran over with a hopeless look on his face. “Matty, it didn’t fucking work!” The camera had taken a minute of video and then switched to photo mode. The screen was broken so I had not picked up on the malfunction as it was happening. The entire twisted endeavour was all for nothing, and the disappointment plastered across Omar’s face reflected how much the whole idea had meant to him. I gave him a half-hearted apology, and he gave me a big hug and reaffirmed his fondness for me as a “brother.” I then jumped back into the taxi and reiterated the urgency of the situation, to which the driver reiterated his love for speed. With a maniacal grin, he started zig-zagging between traffic through narrow streets at 140km. Normally that would have scared the shit out of me, but given the context and the day I had just had, I sat back, held on, and thought to myself what a wonderful world. *** Several months later, Omar and Fatima parted ways. It may have had something to do with Omar’s general reservations about marriage, but I cannot help feeling that the events described above were somehow instrumental in the engagement coming to an end. One could extrapolate any number of themes from the events of that day; for instance, how globalisation is influencing sexuality across the world. But this story is not about greater truths or meaning: it is about the boundless limits of human weirdness and human experience. And it is about sex. And how ultimately we all like it – for better or worse, it is very easy to get caught up in the moment. It is about three people existing in strange times in a strange place with a great deal of uncertainty about what to do. But it happened. And I could never bring myself to say I regret it. I am heading back to Egypt at the end of this year and I wonder to myself what will happen if Omar has a new fiancée and the same enthusiasm for amateur pornography. I suppose I’ll find out sooner or later.
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Features
Issue 3 10/03/2013The Critic Legal High Review
Yesterday afternoon I was surprised by an unusual proposition from Critic: consume and review five different types of legal highs over the course of a night. After two minutes of mental deliberation – involving some ninja-like backwards rationalising my way out of prior commitments – I decided that in the name of student journalism and personal curiosity, I would accept. Personally, I have had some past experience with legal highs; it would be even more irresponsible to take five different types in the course of a night if you had none. My opinion of them is lukewarm. The legal high market has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years thanks to the tireless efforts of well-known fun-police members, United Future and the Otago Daily Times, and I agree that legal highs should be subject to the same regulatory standards as other legal drugs like alcohol and tobacco. Legal highs also tend to encounter hostility at both ends of the square circle spectrum: the anti-drug public loathes them for obvious reasons, and much of the pro-drug crowd scorn them as less cool alternatives to their illegal favourites. Anyway, armed with the Critic credit card, your humble Editor and I headed into Cosmic to select my legal drugs of choice for the evening. Ten minutes, $110, and some great customer service later, we walked out ready to begin. Our selection encompassed a range of legal uppers and downers, complete with predictably hippie-friendly labels such as Mr Trippy and Dr. Feelgood – the kind of stuff that occupies a special place in Peter Dunne’s most horrific, panic attack-inducing nightmares. Feeling a little anxious that the evening could degenerate into my own personal nightmare, I parted with the Critic staff and embarked into the “wilderness” to complete my mission. Dr. Feelgood I decided it might not be the most prudent idea to sit alone at my flat with only the ramblings of my legal high-addled brain to entertain me (potentially giving the ODT another headline to froth at the mouth over in the process), so I recruited/convinced a friend – a devout Muslim from Pakistan – to help me out with the serious task of consumption. Hey, it’s all part of the assimilation process man. First up on the agenda was Dr. Feelgood, which didn’t come with any real description apart from what you can infer from the name itself. After swallowing two pills with a healthy swig of goon (glass of water for my Muslim friend), I waited to start feeling good. And then waited some more. Our environment could have not been any more conducive to feeling good – sitting on a sweet balcony in the late afternoon sun, people-watching, and talking general smack to the backdrop of some of North Dunedin’s more lush landscapes. But half an hour later we still weren’t feeling good. And then the placebo chat fired up. Anyone who has taken drugs knows that if the placebo chat has to happen in the first place, things aren’t going to get all Fear and Loathing anytime soon. Maybe we were being impatient? An hour and a half later, we still did not feel particularly good, nor did we feel particularly bad, but instead very similar to how we had felt before. In other words, minus a few irregular organ pains and some increased perspiration, we were about as fucking sober as Peter Dunne at any given Sunday service. Then slowly but surely things began to change – a bit anyway. The balcony’s surroundings started to look a lot more vibrant, the barbeque reggae humming away in the background became a little more enjoyable, and conversation took a decisive turn toward the classic deep and meaningful. We were finally starting to feel good. A discernible something beyond placebo had changed – it was not great, it was certainly not “look at the fucking size of your pupils” euphoric, but it was something, and we were happy with that. 2.5/5